Knowing that a way out exists does not yet tell us whether it is available
A person has been thinking about leaving their job for months. They can explain why that possibility matters to them, know that resigning exists as an option, and can even imagine what they would do afterward.
And yet, they keep working there.
It is easy to conclude that if they really wanted to leave, they would already have done it. But that statement turns the final outcome into an explanation.
Knowing an option does not yet tell us whether the person wants it now, whether they have chosen it, or whether there is a real way to carry it out under their current conditions.
Perhaps other people depend on that income. Perhaps they still do not have a sufficient economic alternative. It may also be that they do have the resources to leave and still do not want to take on the loss of stability that doing so would involve right now.
In all of those cases, the visible behavior may be the same: they do not resign.
What changes is the problem we are trying to understand.
Not doing it does not explain the difficulty
When a person identifies an alternative and does not carry it out, the space between those two things is quickly filled: perhaps they do not really want it, they are afraid, they are self-sabotaging, or they lack discipline.
Any of those explanations might turn out to be relevant in a particular case. The problem appears when one is adopted before establishing which conditions are present.
The opposite can also happen. The person says “I can’t,” and that expression is taken as proof that the alternative is closed.
That is not enough either.
“They did not do it” can coexist with a material constraint, lack of information, a real dependence, a cost the person does not want to take on, or a difficulty of another kind. These possibilities do not form a classification. They only show that the same outcome does not by itself identify what is happening.
That is why, before explaining why an option was not carried out, it is useful to specify what the concrete option is and what, in that case, is separating knowing it from being able to carry it out.
A real constraint is not a psychological failure
There are situations in which an option is constrained by conditions that do not change with motivation.
A person may know that they could live somewhere else and still not have sufficient resources. They may consider leaving an activity while having a concrete obligation that prevents them from doing so at that moment. They may know which boundary they would like to express and face a threat that materially changes the consequences of doing so.
In cases like these, explaining the difficulty as fear of change, low self-esteem, or lack of will can shift attention from a concrete constraint to a supposed internal failure.
But the same caution works in the other direction. A person may have sufficient resources and still be in conflict about what they want to do. They may feel fear in the face of a feasible option. They may recognize an alternative and decide not to choose it.
The task is not to decide in advance whether the difficulty is “external” or “internal.” It is to establish which conditions are actually relevant in that situation.
Being costly does not make it impossible
Let us return to the job.
Suppose now that the person does have some resources to leave. They could support themselves for a while and there is no concrete threat preventing them from leaving. Resigning, however, would mean reducing income, losing stability, and accepting an uncertainty they do not want to take on right now.
Those costs matter. They are part of the decision.
But a high cost does not by itself make an option impossible.
The alternative may still be feasible and the person may decide not to take on that cost at this moment. That decision does not prove lack of will or incapacity.
That is why “I can’t” and “I don’t want to take on this cost right now” can describe different situations.
Distinguishing them does not make one decision better than the other. It only allows the situation to be described more precisely.
Being imaginable does not make an option real either
The opposite error is to treat any imaginable action as though it were already available.
“You could simply resign,” “you could leave,” or “you could say no” describe actions that are possible in the abstract. They do not yet show that there is a real way to carry them out in that concrete situation.
In the job example, being able to imagine resigning does not answer whether the person has sufficient resources, can take on the immediate consequences, or has obligations that make that moment unfeasible.
There is no need to turn these questions into a closed list.
The point is narrower: the word “could” does not replace analyzing the real conditions.
What can be done changes with the conditions
The availability of an option can change.
A person may not have sufficient resources to leave a job today and may have them months later. New information may appear or an obligation that previously constrained the decision may change.
When those conditions change, what can be done in that situation changes as well.
That does not mean the person has globally become more capable. It means a concrete option may have become more feasible under different conditions.
The same precision works in the other direction: the fact that a person was able to do something once does not prove that they always have access to that same option.
Doing it once does not settle the whole question either
If the person eventually resigns, we know something concrete: they resigned under those conditions.
That is not enough to conclude that they could always have done it in the same way or to reconstruct all earlier conditions retrospectively.
Likewise, the fact that they had not done it before does not by itself demonstrate incapacity.
The final behavior provides information about what happened. It does not automatically explain which conditions made carrying it out possible or difficult.
Making the question more precise
“If you know what to do, why don’t you do it?” groups too many different problems together.
It may be more useful to ask what, in this case, is separating knowing this option from being able to carry it out.
Sometimes the answer will lie in a concrete constraint. Other times the option will be feasible but not wanted or not chosen. In other cases, there will still be a conflict that requires more understanding.
The point is not to turn these possibilities into rigid categories.
It is not to decide on the explanation before looking at the situation.
In MAT, knowing an alternative and being able to carry it out are treated as different questions. The final behavior is also not used by itself to decide whether an option was feasible or impossible.
A person may know an option without yet having sufficient conditions to carry it out. They may have it available and not choose it. They may choose it and encounter difficulties carrying it out.
Between knowing an option and being able to carry it out, there are conditions that need to be distinguished, not guessed.
Once that difference is better delimited, another question remains: what needs to be worked on in therapy in that concrete case.
That will be the problem of the next article in the series.
MAT reference
This article is part of the public development of MAT 0.4.
Reference publication:
Silva, Víctor. (2026). MAT 0.4: arquitectura, conceptos, límites y estado de evidencia (version 1.0, Spanish). Zenodo.
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23050109
Víctor Silva · ORCID 0009-0004-8867-0590
The DOI identifies the Spanish v1.0 publication.